

LEARNING TO HACK

STEFAN P. NICULAE



Applying Reinforcement Learning and Genetic Algorithms
in Game-Theoretic Cyber-Security

ABSTRACT

Penetration testing is the practice of performing a simulated attack on a computer system in order to reveal its vulnerabilities. The most common approach is to gain information and then plan and execute the attack manually, by a security expert. This manual method cannot meet the speed and frequency required for efficient, large-scale security solutions development. To address this, we formalize penetration testing as a security game between an attacker who tries to compromise a network and a defending adversary actively protecting it. We compare multiple algorithms for finding the attacker's strategy, from fixed-strategy to Reinforcement Learning, namely Q-Learning (QL), Extended Classifier Systems (XCS) and Deep Q-Networks (DQN). The attacker's strength is measured in terms of speed and stealthiness, in the specific environment used in our simulations. The results show that QL surpasses human performance, XCS yields worse than human performance but is more stable, and the slow convergence of DQN keeps it from achieving exceptional performance, in addition, we find that all of these Machine Learning approaches outperform fixed-strategy attackers.

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INTRODUCTION

Cyber-security threats are seeing an ever-increasing level of breadth, sophistication and damaging power [11]. Thus, it is becoming increasingly important for security solutions to counteract these threats. When developing a new method, in the field of cyber-security, it is of paramount to be able to validate the approach's effectiveness. Moreover, Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques also require large amounts of data. One of the most common ways to evaluate security defenses is to purposefully attack the system with the intent of discovering weak points and fixing them before a real attacker can take advantage of them.

Penetration testing (pentesting) is the practice of performing a simulated attack on a computer system. It is a form of ethical hacking which assesses vulnerabilities and reveals security weaknesses. It involves the initial reconnaissance, gathering preliminary information about the system; scanning, revealing exposed ports or targetable software; gaining foothold, obtaining shell access on one or more machines; and deploying the payload, to achieve the desired objective. Additional steps include maintaining access by gaining persistence; widening access through lateral movement to other machines and cleaning up to reduce the chance of detection. Pentests are a crucial part of ensuring a system's security.

1.1 MOTIVATION

Manual pentesting, while effective, cannot meet the requirements of AI security techniques: frequent, on-demand, large-scale and preferably repeatable evaluations, which are used to validate incremental method improvements and search for optimal variations. The alternative, existing automatic pentesting tools fail to simulate the threat of a real attacker. To address these issues, this project presents a learning-based method aimed at overcoming the limitations of manual testing and surpassing the effectiveness of existing automated tools. Reinforcement Learning (RL) offers algorithms that learn from their interaction with the environment, bettering themselves at reaching a designated objective. The recent roaring success of RL methods in games such as Chess [38] or Go [39] inspired testing them in this different domain, training an attacker.

The domain of RL gains more and more traction, expedited by successful applications and development of hardware. The field of cyber-security also grows in relevance, as attacks become more sophisti-

cated and stakes increase more and more. The affiliation of RL and cyber-security is a nearly unexplored incursion which brings benefits to both sides: RL techniques can prove their worth in a setting with immediate practical applications, while cyber-security stands to gain a powerful new tool that can bring significant improvements to its existing arsenal.

1.2 OBJECTIVE

The resulting attacking strategy should be able to compromise a given system faster than randomly attempting exploits and should be comparable in strength to a real attacker. Such strategies could be used to simulate a real attacker, with the essential difference that it takes its best shot, on command, any time it is requested. This ability to promptly measure the effectiveness of protective measures paves the way for more robust solutions.

1.3 THESIS STRUCTURE

The structure of this paper is as follows: Chapter 2 provides a summary of some previous approaches for automating pentesting; and describes RL in a general sense, specific algorithms (Q-Learning, Deep Qearnin-Networks, and Extended Classifier System) and recent advancements. Chapter 3 describes the problem formalization, namely, what RL algorithms are to solve, the rules they are subject to and how they are evaluated. 4 contains the description fo fixed-strategy algorithms as well as how RL algorithms are used in this problem. Experimental results, a comparison of the different attacker algorithms and an analysis of parameter configurations are presented in section 5. Finally, conclusions discussed in chapter 6 and future directions in chapter 7.

Note: Collective verb tenses (e.g.: *we observe*) are used throughout the report, even though there is a single author, as stylistic choice – I consider the singular formulation (e.g.: *I did*) to appear too presumptuous for this setting.

Part I

CONTEXT

This part gives the necessary concepts to understand the rest of the project. It provides context by describing previous automating pentesting approaches then describes Reinforcement Learning algorithms that will be used. Finally, the environment which algorithms will learn to solve is detailed.

BACKGROUND

This project combines two mostly disjunctive domains: cyber-security (through pentesting) and Machine Learning (through RL and related methods). Thus, the section follows the clear division between knowledge background and separates them into two sections.

2.1 AUTOMATIC PENTESTING

This section briefly describes three papers that were particularly relevant to this project's model of the pentesting environment. The problems tackled are similar and the ideas expressed served as good inspiration for modeling our environment. For each paper, the environment definition and methods used to solve it are summarized along which parts were incorporated or continued into the present work.

The literature contains relatively few papers dealing with issues similar to ours. Among those, fewer even, save for ones mentioned below, provide a clear and detailed description of their simulated environment.

Elderman et al. [12] simulate a network of four nodes: one "start" node, one "end" node and two intermediate connected in a diamond topology. In this model, there are two agents: an attacker and a defender. Each node is characterized by a tuple of ten integers $(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_{10})$ and $(d_1, d_2, \dots, d_{10})$ for the two agents respectively. At each time-step, the agents choose one node and one value to increment. At any point, the attacker may choose to execute an attack on one node, by using one attack value. If it is higher than the defender's value, the attack is successful. Otherwise, it fails and the attacker has a chance of being detected. None of the agents have knowledge of the other's allocation. The game ends when the "end" node has been successfully attacked, or the attacker has been detected.

Even though only a very simple network is simulated in this paper, it highlights the usefulness of regarding the environment as a dynamic system, where action outcomes are influenced by hidden information.

Applebaum et al. [2] underline the importance of pentesting in the security lifecycle and the shortcomings associated with manual execution. The network model is more complex. It includes shared and personal workstations, dynamic machine connections and local and domain admins. There are three participants in a simulation, namely,

the attacker, the defender, and the gray agent. The gray agent simulates the behavior of normal users on the system, with the main impact of adding user credentials to new machines by logging in, and opening or closing connections. The defender will analyze new connections based on a fixed probability. The attacker can only see the part of the network which is already compromised. The attacker's capabilities range from reconnaissance to exploits, post-exploit, and cautionary techniques. The authors evaluate multiple strategies for choosing the action to execute: from random to fixed-strategy and classical planning-based ones. Performance was measured in terms of the percentage of machines compromised, credentials obtained and sensitive data exfiltrated. They noted that the running time is much higher for planners than for immediate executors. They also concluded that increased connectivity decreases performance for all strategies, because of the overabundance of options.

The explicit modeling of neutral user behavior, a nuance overlooked by most other approaches, brings the simulation closer to the reality and is included in our model as well. Evaluation metrics are incorporated into our reward definition (details in chapter 3) and the fixed-strategy agents proved to be a good starting point (details in chapter 4). Two ideas suggested in [2]'s future work are adopted and continued here: (1) adding a *do nothing* action, to avoid detection and dynamic vulnerability status (patching or adding new vulnerabilities).

Sarraute, Buffet, and Hoffmann [35] target networks with more complex topologies: having asymmetrical connections and clustering themselves into sub-networks. A defender is not explicitly modeled and the attacker's actions are limited to two kinds of scans, a homogenous list of exploits and the option of giving up. Exploits are modeled more in-depth: they may crash the machine and, unsuccessful attempts can reveal further information about the system. Negative rewards are given for action duration risk of duration/detection. To handle the larger network sizes, the authors proposed a "4 Abstraction Level" design: a network is decomposed in sub-networks and the attacker picks its target incrementally: first high-level components then all the way down to individual machines.

As the richer model matches the real world scenario more closely, we use relevant aspects of it, such as detailed exploit properties and the option for the attacker to give up. Decomposing a network into its logical components is an interesting approach, but out of the scope of our project, as we focus on solving smaller networks first.

Out of the other papers consulted, many focused on other aspects of this domain, with little relevance to our formulation. Applebaum et al. [1] use manually entered pre- and post-conditions hand-entered manually, which we avoid. Similarly, [7] concludes that if you spec-

ify actions granularly enough, a classical planner will try everything and eventually find holes in a specification. In [18], a couple of methods are compared, but ultimately none served as inspiration for our approach. Holm and Somestad [19] are concerned with creating a repeatable and audit-able environment for cyber attacks and experimentation, and not with solving it.

2.2 REINFORCEMENT LEARNING

This section starts by briefly describing the type of problems Reinforcement Learning (RL) deals with, follows with descriptions of three algorithms (QL, DQN and XCS) and an overview of some useful extensions and finishes with exemplifying some traditional RL settings.

Along with Supervised and Unsupervised Learning, RL is the third main paradigm in Machine Learning. It concerns itself with finding the best strategy for maximizing cumulative reward in a sequential decision-making problem. The most distinctive trait is that a RL algorithm is in charge not only of learning from observations of the environment, but also steering the way new experience flows in. Figure 2.1 shows the the RL interaction flow. It is composed of an *agent* that selects an action a (from the action space \mathcal{A}) based on the observed state s (from state space \mathcal{S}) of the *environment*. It then adjusts itself based on the received reward $r \in \mathbb{R}$. This process is repeated until the environment reaches a *terminal* state s and the *episode* ends.




Figure 2.1: Reinforcement Learning process

This section introduces the agents whose performance is measured. These algorithms are a part of a family of *value iteration* [41] methods. The learned strategy (i.e.: what action to take in each situation), known as *policy* is derived greedily from the value estimation, meaning that the action with the highest expected value is chosen, in each

situation. This way, the problem of learning an efficient strategy boils down to accurately approximating state-action values. If one knows which action is best in each situation, following the induced course of action inevitably leads to the maximum reward.

Each subsection presents increasingly more complex techniques. From a basic tabular approach (2.2.1), to basic algorithm extensions (2.2.2) and finally to an approximate method (2.2.3) and its extensions (2.2.4).

2.2.1 Q-Learning

One of the simplest RL methods, Q-Learning (QL), builds a state-action *value* table $Q(s, a)$. It holds the utility estimates of taking action a in state s , for all actions tried in every encountered state. The pseudocode is presented in Algorithm 1.

Algorithm 1: Q-Learning with ϵ -greedy policy

```

Initialize Q-table arbitrarily,  $Q(s, a)$  for all  $s \in \mathcal{S}$ ,  $a \in \mathcal{A}$ 
foreach episode do
     $s \leftarrow$  environment's initial state
    repeat
        if exploring (with probability  $\epsilon$ ) then
             $a \leftarrow$  sampled randomly from  $\mathcal{A}$ 
        else if exploiting then
             $a \leftarrow \operatorname{argmax}_i Q(s, i)$ 
         $r, s' \leftarrow$  environment's reaction to taking action  $a$ 
         $f \leftarrow$  future value  $\begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } s' \text{ is terminal} \\ \max_i Q(s', i) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$ 
        update  $Q(s, a)$  towards computed action value  $r + \gamma f$ ,
        with step size  $\alpha$ 
         $s \leftarrow$  next state  $s'$ 
    until  $s$  is terminal;
end

```

The algorithm's parameters are the discount factor $0 < \gamma < 1$, usually close to one and the learning rate (or step size) $0 < \alpha < 1$, usually very small and the exploration probability $0 < \epsilon < 1$. The discount factor controls how much immediate rewards are preferred over delayed ones. Low values produce more hedonistic behavior while high values lead to more visionary behavior. The learning process is quite sensitive to the setting of these parameters. Initial $Q(s, a)$ values are set to zero.

One of the most common action selection strategies is ϵ -greedy. When prompted for the next action to take, from state s , the agent acts greedily w.r.t the value estimations by exploiting current information: $\operatorname{argmax}_a Q(s, a)$. By acting greedily, the strategy may get

stuck in a local optimum. To enable exploration of alternative, potentially better routes, a random action is selected, with probability ϵ .

Action				State
a_1	a_2	a_3	a_4	
0	7	2	2	s_1
6	0	5	4	s_2
3	3	9	6	s_3
8	3	3	4	s_4
6	2	1	0	s_5
...				...
4	5	2	8	s_n

Figure 2.2: A Q-table amidst an update

Figure 2.2 shows the an example of an action-value table. Entries are populated and an a new observation is processed: after taking action a_3 in state s_2 , a reward r is received and the environment ends up in state s_4 . Thus, the value estimate for action a_3 in state s_2 (maroon cell) will be updated towards the immediate reward r plus discounted future reward: action values in the next state (grey cells).

2.2.2 Q-Learning Extensions

While it is a simple algorithm, QL can receive a couple of basic techniques which improve its convergence speed and stability. The slight downside of extending the algorithm is that each technique brings additional parameters which need to be tuned to obtain optimum performance.

EXPLORATORY STARTS: Instead of setting all initial $Q(s, a)$ values to zero, they can be initialized randomly. Usually, they are drawn from a normal distribution $N(\mu, \sigma)$ of zero-mean μ and small standard deviation σ . This provides artificial incentives for the agent to try different actions, especially initially, and reduces the chance of getting stuck in a local minimum.

DECAYING LEARNING RATE: Instead of keeping the learning rate α constant, it can be decreased over time, down to a set minimum. Usually, the decay is an exponential (multiplying by a sub-unitary coefficient) or step function (divided by a factor after a set period of episodes). This allows the agent to learn a lot from the environment at first, making rapid improvements at the beginning of training and fine refinements near the end, when finesse is required not to overshoot the optimum.

ANNEALED EXPLORATION RATE: Instead of abiding by the same exploration rate ϵ the whole training time, it can be annealed down to a set minimum. Usually, it starts very high (near 100% chance of exploration) and is decreased linearly over the course of a set number of episodes. This allows the agent to learn to explore a lot at first, when it does not have a good idea of which strategy works best, and later focus on improving the constructed policy, after gaining enough experience.

IDEALIZATION: Instead of optimistically estimating next state value reward by looking at the maximum action value available then, the agent can take a more conservative approach and average the action values. This is known as the SARSA learning algorithm [41]. We introduce a generalization of these approaches, in the form of an *idealization* coefficient. It allows for cautious, but not cowardly behavior. Estimation of future value changes as follows:

$$f \leftarrow \text{avg}_a + \eta(\max_a - \text{avg}_a)$$

where $0 \leq \eta \leq 1$ is the idealization coefficient, and *avg* and *max* refer to action a value estimates in the next state s' . Setting it to 0 corresponds to pure SARSA while setting it to 1 corresponds to QL.

Just by using these simple extensions, the problem of combining them becomes apparent. Perhaps decaying the learning rate over 300 episodes increases performance, and, separately, annealing the exploration rate over 200 episodes boosts it as well. But when both extensions are applied together, it could turn out that an even better performance is achieved when the decay happens over 150 episodes and the anneal over 100.

2.2.3 Deep Q-Network

The state-action value table used by QL can be replaced by an approximate model, such as a Neural Network (NN) [5]. This algorithm is called Deep Q-Network (DQN) [29] and is able to leverage state similarities to obtain better generalization. There is one input for each

state feature and one output for each action. The pseudocode is presented in Algorithm 2.

Algorithm 2: Deep Q-Network algorithm with ϵ -greedy policy

```

Initialize Q-network weights randomly
foreach episode do
     $s \leftarrow$  environment's initial state
    repeat
         $q(i) \leftarrow$  Q-network value estimation of each action  $i$  in
            current state  $s$ 
        if exploring (with probability  $\epsilon$ ) then
             $a \leftarrow$  sampled randomly from  $\mathcal{A}$ 
        else if exploiting then
             $a \leftarrow \operatorname{argmax}_i q(i)$ 
         $r, s' \leftarrow$  environment's reaction to taking action  $a$ 
         $f \leftarrow$  future value  $\begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } s' \text{ is terminal} \\ \max_i Q(s', i) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$ 
         $q(a) \leftarrow$  computed action value  $r + \gamma f$ 
        fit Q-network on  $(s, q)$ 
         $s \leftarrow$  next state  $s'$ 
    until  $s$  is terminal;
end

```

The algorithm's parameters include the discount factor γ and the exploration rate ϵ . The remarks made in 2.2.1 apply here as well, including the description of ϵ -greedy action selection policy. Joining these hyper-parameters are the NN's learning parameters such as layer sizes, activation functions, loss function, optimizer, weight initialization method and so on. As with any NN problem, they affect the outcome of the algorithm dramatically.

Figure 2.3 shows a DQN schematic: state features s_i (here having four features) are fed in, pass through a hidden layer (of five neurons) and output estimated value for each action (here three actions). Black values (2, 5, 3) are NN predictions and the maroon value is the observed goodness of the third action.

The presented algorithm is a slightly simplified version, with the purpose of easier comprehension. In practice, each transition (s, a, r, s') observed is stored in a circular memory buffer, with limited space, where old transitions are replaced by newer ones. Afterward, instead of fitting the Q-network on a single example (s, q) , a batch of transitions is sampled from the memory buffer. This not only improves the practical performance of the agent, by allowing itself to replay past experiences after evolving but also satisfies the theoretical requirements of points to be identically and independently distributed, which is missed when transitions are processed sequentially.




Figure 2.3: A Deep Q-Network amidst an interaction of the environment

While the increased generalization power of NNs can lead to better understanding of the environment’s features, it also comes with the drawback of needing significantly more data, longer training times and having many more hyper-parameters to tune.

2.2.4 Deep Q-Network Extensions

This section presents recent RL advancements pertaining to DQN. This is far from an exhaustive list and focuses on methods that have been reported to yield great results in the literature together with ones the authors believe have great potential.

2.2.4.1 Reinforcement Learning Algorithm

These extensions target the RL flow itself, not so much the NN used to model the reward function.

MULTI-STEP RETURNS: Described by Sutton, Barto, and Klopff [41]. Instead of looking just one step ahead, taking an aggregate (average, maximum, etc) of action values in the next state and discounting them by γ , the agent can look further into future steps and discounting by $\gamma^2, \gamma^3, \gamma^4$ and so on. This improves the accuracy of future value estimation.

DOUBLE: Introduced by Hasselt [16]. A second, identical, network is used for value predictions, updated (or slowly, but constantly) periodically to match the main network. This stabilizes the learning process by avoiding spiraling out of control when chasing

a moving target. Additionally, it helps fight overly optimistic value estimations.

DUELING: Introduced by Wang et al. [42]. The state-action value function $Q(s, a)$ is decoupled into state value $V(s)$ (the intrinsic utility of being in state s) and action advantage $A(a)$ (how much better it is to take action a compared to the other choices). This has the benefit that the value stream is updated more often, especially in environments where many actions are available.

PRIORITIZED EXPERIENCE REPLAY: Introduced by Schaul et al. [36]. Instead of sampling transitions uniformly from the memory buffer, they can be sampled proportional to the NN error produced. This way transitions the model has much to learn from are favored and training time is used more fruitfully.

DISTRIBUTIONAL: Introduced by Bellemare, Dabney, and Munos [4]. Instead of estimating a single number for the state-action values, a distribution can be estimated. This way, an aggregation of the possible reward outcomes is not forced and non-normal reward distribution shapes can be modeled more efficiently. This technique is particularly effective when the environment presents high stochasticity or is influenced by information not reflected in the state features.

NOISY NETS: Introduced by Fortunato et al. [13]. It is a way to inject exploration constraints straight into the estimation process, by adding parametric noise to the network weights.

BOLTZMANN EXPLORATION: The ϵ -greedy action selection policy can be exchanged for one that enables more guided exploration. Instead of sampling randomly, actions are selected proportional to their estimated values. There are multiple ways of controlling the amount of exploration done. The tendency to sample uniformly (as opposed to focusing on high-values) can be decreased as more experience is gathered. Alternatively, in a *Max-Boltzmann* policy, proportional exploitation is done with probability ϵ , and the maximum value is selected otherwise, similar to ϵ -greedy.

STATE HISTORY: Show more than just the latest state for deciding on an action, in order to capture temporal relationships. Previous states can have their features concatenated, or they can be explicitly handled by the network's architecture.

ASYNCHRONICITY: Key component of [34]. Instead of having a single agent, train multiple, independent ones and periodically sync their experiences. This enables fresh perspectives and teleportation out of local minima.

OTHER DIRECTIONS: More drastic extensions involve incorporating Policy Gradient [41] elements, as exemplified by Actor-Critic methods [30]. More exotic approaches make use of concepts such as *intrinsic motivation*, as is the case of Hierarchical-DQN [25]; or perform trust-region optimization [37].

Each of the described extensions changes the vanilla DQN algorithm significantly. Combined, they make an almost unrecognizable amalgamation. But the heart of the algorithm stays the same, only its performance is the one being altered (hopefully in a positive way).

2.2.4.2 Neural Network Model

These extensions target the NN predictive model but are limited to ones having particularly high applicability in RL.

BAYESIAN NETWORKS: Introduced as a RL technique by Gal and Ghahramani [14]. Bayesian NNs are better equipped to deal with uncertainty. Their theoretical properties can successfully be satisfied by interspersing Dropout [40] layers.

WEIGHTED IMPORTANCE SAMPLING: When computing the loss gradient, focus more on samples having greater errors. This allows the model to pay more attention to mistakes.

BATCH NORMALIZATION: Introduced by Ioffe and Szegedy [22]. It normalizes activations values among different batches, making the learning more robust in the face of high fluctuations.

LOSS FUNCTION: The Huber Loss function acts like the Mean Squared Error when the difference is small, and like the Mean Absolute Error when the difference is large. It increases the learning's robustness to outlier reward values.

ARCHITECTURE: If shown multiple previous states, a Recurrent layers [15], specifically Long Short Term Memory units, can successfully deal with temporal interactions. Even though the described environments do not have homogenous features with a spatial neighboring relationship, Convolutional layers [15] can still be used on time slices.

OTHER COMPONENTS: The usual moving parts of NNs, of course, have a big impact on model performance. Layer activation function, weights initialization method, and regularization need to be considered.

ENSEMBLES: As is the case of many NN applications, multiple models in cooperation usually outperform any single contender. To this end, a more complex model can be created by compounding multiple different configurations. This way, the strengths of

one can complement the weaknesses of another and vice-versa. Their decisions can be aggregated by a majority-voting system, or a more sophisticated meta-model, such as a Decision Tree [5], or another NN.

These model changes can have a dramatic impact on the NN's ability to successfully model the reward function. Not only by themselves but also when taken in combination with RL techniques described previously.

2.2.5 Linear Classifier System

A third method, less popular lately, uses a Linear Classifier System [3] – a rule-based Machine Learning algorithm in which the rule-discovery component is handled by a Genetic Algorithm. States and actions are encoded as binary strings and rules take the form *if in state 010# then take action 101*, where the wildcard character # matches any value. Extended Classifier System (XCS) [9] is a variation designed specifically for RL. The mechanics are, again, similar to QL. Starting from Algorithm 1, line (1) changes to create a new random rule on reaching a previously unencountered state s . Line (8) changes to select the rule that estimates the best reward and is the most accurate. Line (10) involves updating the fitness and statistics of the rule that selected the action. Additionally, genetic operators are applied to the rule-set population to achieve optimization and exploration.

State			~	Action		Fitness
0	1	0	~	0	0	2
#	0	#	~	1	1	4
0	1	1	~	1	1	3
0	1	0	~	0	1	3
#	1	1	~	1	0	1

Figure 2.4: An Extended Classifier System ruleset amidst an update

Figure 2.4 shows how a classifier set is updated when presented with a new observation. Finding itself in state 011 , two rules match (highlighted in grey), one selecting action 3 (11), the other selecting action 2 (10). The agent picks the first rule, because of the higher fitness (highlighted in maroon).

The efficiency of algorithms and extensions described above is measured through the prism of common RL benchmarks. One of the most common testbeds is the Atari environment [28], in which the

agent learns to play arcade video games. Combining the extensions described has been shown to yield better performance than any individual one [17]. It has been shown that the amount of observations the agent is exposed to is paramount to achieved performance [20].

Our project aims not to introduce the pentesting problem as a new RL benchmark, but to apply established RL algorithms in this domain. One common trait of well-performing algorithms on the Atari environment is the use of Convolutional Neural Networks. They bring not only computational efficiency through fewer connections but also allow for deeper architectures. The pentesting environment cannot reap such benefits as the training data (described in 3.3) is missing both the homogeneity and the spatial relationships of screen pixels. This holds except for, perhaps, convolution through states history. But the state features adhere to (Partially Observable) Markov Decision Process constraints, meaning they fully describe past events, unlike the velocity of a ball, for example, which cannot be determined from a single static screen frame.

2.2.6 Classical Settings

Before we present our the formalization developed for the pentesting problem, it is useful to develop an intuition by studying classical RL settings and their formalization.



Figure 2.5: Examples of classical RL settings

Figure 2.5 shows three settings appearing predominantly in introductory RL works. *Grid-world* is the simplest of them all: start from the bottom left and move to the top right, avoiding grey squares. Normal rules apply for *chess*, as well as for the *Pac-man* video game.

More exotic settings depart from the previously predominant two-dimensional archetype. A robot arm can discover the most efficient way to throw a ball, taking as input three-dimensional as well as time-wise information. Another possible application is automatic maintenance, which entails finding the longest amount of time a component can function before repairs are applied to it, based on sensor mea-

surements. Even more different is the application of RL techniques in stock trading, in which an agent learns the best investment strategy. Perhaps the most unexpected domain of them all is international negotiation, in which an intelligence is trained to obtain the best deal for all parties involved.

Table 2.1: Examples of RL formalizations

Setting	State	Actions	Rewards
Grid-world	x, y	$\leftarrow \rightarrow \uparrow \downarrow$	+1 on goal
Chess	pieces location	move pieces	± 1 on win/lose
Pac-man	player & enemies	$\leftarrow \rightarrow \uparrow \downarrow$	+1 per pellet
Robot	x, y, z , velocity	activate motors	target proximity
Maintenance	sensors	continue/repair	-1 on accident
Stocks	companies info	buy/sell	profit
Pentesting	machines state	attacker actions	objective based

Table 2.1 shows possible RL formalizations for the aforementioned settings. The area affording the most design freedom is the rewards function. As we can see, there is large variation. The reward signal can be solely positive (as in the case of *Grid-world*), solely negative (as in the case of automatic maintenance), or it can range both ways. Additionally, it can be sparse, awarded at the end of the episode (as in the case of chess) or frequent (*Pac-man*). Some problems work better with discrete values, while others naturally lend themselves to real-domains (e. g.: robot arm control).

Not much research attention has been dedicated to the joint topic of RL in pentesting. Existing work focuses on describing popular AI techniques and briefly touches on Cyber-Security applications, much less on attacker emulation [8]. Another approach uses QL as one of the tested algorithms but focuses on a limited environment [10]. Evolutionary Algorithms have been used to find the best order of patching vulnerabilities, however, requiring a human expert to rank the vulnerabilities' impact [24].

ENVIRONMENT DEFINITION

This section describes the model of the pentesting problem we designed: environment rules, actors interaction and what their objectives, restrictions and available actions are. We strive to reach an abstraction that is both feasible to implement, so RL methods can be applied, while also staying close to the real world, so the obtained strategy is relevant in a real setting.

The designed abstraction can be seen as a Game-Theory model, in which multiple agents compete in a zero-sum game.

One of the first steps of defining a task as a Reinforcement Learning problem is setting the boundary between what is a controllable action and what is an environmental response.

A very illustrative example is given by Sutton, Barto, and Klopff [41] where the problem of driving a car is brought up as an exercise. What is the granularity one should choose? Should the agent be able to control the acceleration, brake and steering, or maybe how each individual tire interacts with the ground or how brain impulses are sent to arm and leg muscles. Maybe even more high level: the controllable part should be what the ride's destination is.

We encountered similar issues when defining what actions the attacking agent should have and its disposal and what events should the machine respond with. Regarding the actions, the most nonrestrictive, but the farthest away from the realm of viability would be to allow the agent to create scripts at character level. This way the agent could re-discover not only the basics of hacking but would also have the possibility of discovering completely new exploits and ways of penetrating. But this huge amount of flexibility, is as close to impossible to learn as it is tempting to think about.

The next idea to naturally come up is restricting the flexibility from character-level to word-level. Previously, ML algorithms have been shown to be able to generate malicious SQL queries with moderate success rate. That, however, was a much narrower domain than ours, and thus we must restrict the agent's granularity even further.

The approach we ended up using allows the agent to issue high-level actions. They abstract multiple low-level commands that perform a single logical action, and can be naturally bundled together. Translation to concrete actions is not the focus of this current project and is left for future work.

The scarcity of previous in-depth approaches in the automated pen-testing literature caused a very large portion of the project’s development to be spent on environment formalization, and possibly be prone to empirical biases.




Figure 3.1: Actors and their interaction in the environment

We formalize a penetration test as a security game between an attacker and a defender. The game takes place on a network, with a single entry node. At each discrete time-step, the attacker picks one out of the available actions and the defender can counter-act. Additionally, the grey agent has no objective and simulates the behavior of benign users, performing their usual behavior unknowingly. The attacker’s objective is to compromise as much of the network, as quickly and quietly as possible, while the defender actively protects it.

Figure 3.1 shows a schematic of the three actors (Attacker, Defender and Normal User) and how they interact with the computer network.

As an illustrative example, the final state of a game ending in a successful attack is shown in Figure 3.2. Not all the steps can be reproduced by a single static snapshot of the network, so a possible path reaching here is described below. The attacker compromised on machines 1 and 7, obtained elevated permissions on machines 2 and 5 and has lost its foothold on machine 0 after a detection. On its way to exfiltrating data from the goal (machine 7), it made use of credentials obtained from machine 1, where it also obtained persistence; cleaned up after performing steps late into the attack on machine 5. The defender is unaware, but suspicious, of which actions the attacker performed, and on what machines. Because of previously getting detected, the attacker triggered the defender to block access to machine 4. The failure of an attack could be caused by the defender blocking key actions on specific machines, leaving the attacker no available moves. The defender cannot possess unlimited blocking resources as they are an abstraction of human intervention. In the real world, they




Figure 3.2: Network at the end of an attack

would come at the cost of the security expert's time, computing resources, and the defended system's productivity.

3.1 NETWORK

The network is modeled after an empirical observation of common enterprise topologies. Connections are bi-directional and are made up of multiple *star* components. The entry point and the goal point are located on diametrically opposed parts of the network, with one of them standing at the end of a line path.

Each machine is assigned one or more local users. Each user belongs to one type (global admin, software developer, non-technical employee). Machine vulnerabilities are governed by assigned user type.

The local users collectively represent the grey agent. It does not act adaptively, and its purpose is to model the noise found in the real environments. At each time-step the agent has a small probability to perform one of:

- Reboot a machine, clearing foothold status obtained by the attacker.
- Log in to another machine, making the admin's credentials available there as well.
- Install new software, adding vulnerabilities to a machine.

3.2 ATTACKER

The attacker simulates a pentester, who, in turn, mimics a real hacker. Its actions follow a subset of MITRE's ATT&CK [26] model of cyber adversary behavior:

RECONNAISSANCE: gathering information prior to exploiting

- *enumerate* a machine to reveal its connections
- *scan* a previously discovered machine in order to reveal the exploits it is vulnerable to

GAINING Foothold: exploiting to gain entry or a stronger foothold

- *exploit* a revealed vulnerability
- *login* using previously dumped credentials
- *migrate* from another machine (lateral movement)
- *escalate* existing session privileges (elevate permissions)

POST-EXPLOIT: complete attack objectives; available only on compromised machines

- *persist* in order to gain resilience against reboots and detection
- *dump* credentials of local admins
- *exfiltrate* sensitive data on the machine
- *cleanup* to reduce footprint of previous actions

AUXILIARY: miscellaneous actions

- *wait*, to let the defender's suspicion cool-off
- perform *evasive maneuvers* to reduce the next action's noise
- *abandon* when payoff is considered lower than risk

Each action has a number of properties, which naturally lend themselves to costs:

- *reliability*: probability of succeeding
- *duration*: time steps required
- *noise*: chance of detection
- *crash* probability (only for exploits)

To maintain action properties anchored in real facts, we set them according to widely-accepted categorizations. The exploits are parsed from Metasploit [27] (most popular pentesting framework) source code. Their associated costs are an aggregation of NIST's NVD [6] scores, mainly *attack complexity*, *exploitability score*, *impact score*, *user action required* and *publication date*. Other action properties are estimated manually by penetration testers and security researchers.

3.3 SHOWN INFORMATION

The attacker has access to information that characterizes the environment at the current time step. It does not have access to full information – the process remains partially observable. To avoid giving the agent an unfair advantage over manual pentesters, the automated attacker is shown only the information that a human could easily deduce/find while carrying the pentest.

Designing informative yet distinctive state components is a big challenge. We started by asking experienced pentesters what features they look at when conducting an attack: how do they decide what to do next and how do they assess the value of a machine. Unfortunately, the answers were inconclusive, as they targeted hard to quantify properties, e.g.: "knowing from experience". The most relevant ideas were to show the Operating System, open ports and the number of connections. We designed the environment with these properties in mind, but they are not sufficient to differentiate machines and are not indicative of the machine's value in the attack.

Another way we posed the question was "if one of your (also experienced) pentester colleague was in the middle of an attack, stopped at one point and let you take over, what information would you need to have passed over?". Another way to look at it is describing what information would a complete novice need to look at, in order to perfect its pentesting skills. In the end, we converged to the following state features:

- actions performed, and on what machines
- what actions *available* to be taken next
- machines compromised, connections discovered, user credentials obtained
- action properties (reliability, duration, etc)

Action availability follows the rule of "what would make sense". For example, enumerating the connections of an already enumerated machine is useless; an exploit will not be attempted blindly, before discovering that the machine is vulnerable to it; if foothold has been achieved, there is no use in further scanning for vulnerabilities; etc.

3.4 DEFENDER

The defender agent models counter-actions done automatically by an anti-virus solution or manually by a security officer. In relationship to the attack's time, possible defender actions are:

- *instant* detection at the time of the attack, based on the action's noise

- *investigate* machines, possibly targeted in the past by the attacker, based on the defender's suspicion
- *prevent* future attack targets by blocking possible targets

On detection, the attacker is kicked off the machine, losing foothold status (gaining persistence circumvents this) and warranting more attention. Additionally, if the detection was the result of an investigation, the entry method is patched. The defender's suspicion level (used in investigation) increases as multiple actions are done in rapid succession; and decreases over time, in periods of low attacker activity. One "attention resource" is earned by the defender after each detection. They are allocated to protect key places, such as valuable information or gateway nodes. One resource blocks a single action on a selected machine.

3.5 EVALUATION

An episode ends when the objective has been reached, such as exfiltrating data from the target machine or compromising a total number of machines. On the other hand, it also ends if there are no more moves available, as a result of efficient defender measures. It can also end prematurely if the attacker decides to give up.

The reward given after each action is the one that guides agent behavior (learning algorithms are briefly described in 2.2). By changing actions that are rewarded positively, we can encourage the pursuit of different objectives. By changing actions rewarded negatively, we can warn the agent about effects it should be cautious about.

The main performance metrics are swiftness (time steps taken) and stealthiness (inverse number of times detected). Other, more detailed metrics are: the percentage of machines compromised, percentage of machines data has been exfiltrated from, and percentage of credentials stolen.

Part II

APPLICATION

This part defines fixed-strategy agents and describes how Reinforcement Learning algorithms interact with the environment formalization. Afterwards their progress and hyper-parameters responses are analyzed and compared against one another, and to a human reference strategy.

ATTACKER AGENTS

This section describes algorithms used to find the attacker's strategy. There are two kinds of agents: those operating based on a fixed strategy and those that learn from experience. The latter match the RL algorithms described in 2.2, applied in the pentesting environment.

4.1 FIXED-STRATEGY AGENTS

The algorithms described in this section do not adapt to the environment's response. They are used as a baseline for evaluating learning agents performance, and can also be used to enhance them with initial knowledge, giving them a head-start and a faster convergence.

The simplest fixed-strategy agent is the Random agent. For any given state, it selects uniformly out of the available actions. Another conceptually simple agent is the Greedy agent. It behaves in accordance with a pre-defined list of preferences. If the most preferred action is available, it always selects that (machine chosen randomly), if not, check the next one, and so on. If none of the preferred actions are available, it acts randomly. The final fixed-strategy is the Finite State Machine (FSM). It acts in pre-defined order. If the action on the first place is available, it selects that (machine chosen randomly) and advances to the next action place. If the action on the current place is unavailable, it acts randomly. The strategies for Greedy and FSM were set after an exhaustive search of possible permutations of a subset of actions.

Figure 4.1 shows a possible situation for a FSM agent. The action it is supposed to select is *enumerate*, but it is unavailable. As a result, it will take random actions until *enumerate* becomes available. Afterwards, it will attempt to select *migrate*, and so on.

While fixed-strategy agents provide a lower bound for learning agents' performance, the upper target is given by manual performance. The manual run is comprised of steps picked by a human pentester, having full knowledge of network topology and credential locations. The strategy efficiently navigates towards the goal, in a swift and stealthy manner.

The full list of actions is given in Appendix B.




Figure 4.1: FSM decision process diagram

4.2 REINFORCEMENT LEARNING FORMALIZATIONS

This section describes the components used by learning-based agents. They are concrete implementations of environment concepts described in chapter 3, namely state, action, and rewards.

4.2.1 State

Information about the current environment state, as described in section 3.3, is mainly made up of information about already performed and currently available actions. Classical environments feature "localized" state features, that change greatly with interaction. Such as the x and y positions in a 2D maze; the 3D coordinates and velocity of a robot arm or the pixels/RAM content when playing a video game. However, in the case of pentesting, a straightforward "local" state definition is not so evident. One idea is to show information just about the current (i.e.: last acted on) machine. But then the agent would lack the option to operate on any other than that. Another idea would be to show information about the current machine and all its neighbors. Besides padding issues (for all machines other than the most connected ones), this brings the shortcoming that one cannot operate on a machine close to the goal, then search for credentials on a distant machine, close to the entry, and then come back, which could be part of an efficient strategy.

There is also the issue of feature selection. Even though multiple sources information (about *performed*, and *available* actions) can be shown, showing its entirety is not guaranteed to benefit to the learning algorithm. Some of it may be redundant. Furthermore, informa-

	m ₁	m ₂	m ₃	m ₄	...	m ₈	n/a
enumer	✓	✓	○	○			✓ evade
scan	✓	✓	✓	○		○	○ wait
migrate			○	✓			abandon
login				○			
escalate	✓	✓		✓			
persist	○	✓		○			
dump	○	✓		○			
exfiltrate	○	○		✓			
cleanup	✓	○		✓			
exploit ₁							
exploit ₂	✓		○				
...							
exploit ₂₄		✓	○				

✓ performed
 ○ available

Figure 4.2: State features in the middle of an attack

tion overload can even degrade agent performance. An algorithm that achieves good performance while looking at only a couple of state features may become overwhelmed and do much worse when presented with the full information. Even though the entirety of information might, in theory, enable reaching higher possible performance. Thus, it might be better to ignore some sources of information or the possibility of taking some actions entirely.

Another step in this direction is to reduce the number of exploits (grouped under the action *exploit* defined in 3.2). This offers the agent a single, simplified action: *exploit*. The specific exploit is decided automatically, based on a pre-defined manual ranking.

As a concrete example, consider an environment of 8 machines (max connectivity degree 4) and 24 exploits, with the full information shown. There are 267 possible actions, the cartesian product of ($machine_1, \dots, machine_8$) and ($enumerate, scan, login, migrate, escalate, persist, dump, exfiltrate, cleanup, exploit_1, \dots, exploit_{24}$) plus the three untargeted actions *wait, evade, abandon*. The action availability and performed actions vectors have the same length. The restricted representation described in the previous paragraph brings state size (which is the same as the number of moves) down to 52 (5 machines, 9 targeted actions, 1 simplified exploit and 2 un-targeted actions).

The state representation described above is visualized in Figure 4.2. It shows a matrix where each row represents one action and each column one machine (except for the last column which shows untargeted actions). For each cell, the agent can know one of the following: it has been performed (successfully); it is available to be chosen as the next action; or it hasn't attempted it and knows nothing about it.

4.2.2 *Reward*

The reward function closely follow the description in 3.5. A small positive amount is awarded for gaining foothold (only for the first time on each machine), exfiltrating data and obtaining credentials and a large one is obtained for completing the goal. A large negative penalty is incurred upon detection by the defender, to encourage stealthiness and a small negative reward is applied for each time step, to favor swiftness.

The sparsity of rewards, a cornerstone issue in RL, also came up while designing the reward function. One early formulation consisted of providing a positive reward only when the objective is completed and a negative penalty per time-step. But the agents learned that it is better to wait and incur the small penalty, unknowing that there is a large payout worth exploring for. Another formulation, aimed at guiding the agent towards the goal faster, awarded reward inversely proportional to the goal machine proximity. It worked well, but we felt it provided an unfair advantage to the agent, as a real attacker would not have access to such information.

4.2.3 *Practical Considerations*

To avoid waiting indefinitely, a limit is imposed on the number of maximum consecutive *wait* actions. Also, to speed-up training and avoid dead-ends, the maximum number of moves is capped.

One particularly tricky action was *abandon*. As it causes the episode to end instantly, it has the dangerous effect of throwing away current progress, if chosen as part of a random exploration. For this reason, it was either disabled for fixed-strategy agents or assigned a large negative reward for learning agents, to dissuade unfounded usage.

A very large number of episodes is usually needed for RL algorithms to converge. For this reason, fast simulation of the environment a requirement. As the rules of the environment are computed entirely on boolean arrays, we obtained significant speed-ups (over 40x) when switching the representation from a list of numbers to a single integer, viewed as base two and using bit-wise operators.

4.3 LEARNING AGENTS

We experimented with three kinds of learning agents: tabular Q-Learning (QL), Extended Classifier Systems (XCS) and the Deep Q-Network (DQN), defined in 2.2. For each of them, the input state representation is a bit different. As described in the previous subsection, each observation is a list of booleans. To make indexing easier, for QL, the list is treated as a number in base two and converted to base 10 (e.g. (1, 1, 0) will be indexed under 6). The state representation matches the XCS input, as it already expects a binary string. For DQN, the binary numbers are fed in directly.

Figure 4.3 shows the evolution of total reward received, by each learning agent. An agent's performance is evaluated periodically during training, with exploration functions disabled. Due to the stochasticity of the environment, at each evaluation, 50 episodes are run and their average is presented. The thin line shows the actual reward, while the thick line is a rolling average over 5 previous and following periodic evaluations. The first, left-most, points for each agent show performance achieved after training for a single episode. The starting performance differs from one algorithm to another as it is largely influenced by the random initialization of each. Because QL is relatively fast, compared to XCS and DQN, it is able to process more episodes in the same period of time. To make the comparison fair, the agents were ran for approximately the same amount of time (40h), in which they have experienced different numbers of episodes (details in Appendix B).

QL improves quickly at first and then refines the built strategy. It produces considerable variance from one episode to another. One interesting fact is that the evaluation is not monotonously increasing: forgoing the best strategy, exploring worse ones enables arriving at a better one in the end. XCS has a steadier improvement and is less noisy. This could be thanks to the natural mapping of state features to rule formation. DQN achieves modest increase and shows relatively high variance during training. It requires much longer training times, which also why it was run for fewer episodes.

Modern RL advancements are focused on DQN and other approximate models, as they perform best in classic settings such as Atari games. In our pentesting environment though, the tabular QL approach achieved better performance, at least when comparing with the same training time. This advantage was only possible after adapting some DQN extensions to QL.

Another significant improvement was brought about by initializing action values according to the Greedy agent preference. Due to the nature of the problem, neither extreme aggression nor complete lack of risk characterizes a good agent. One way an agent assesses this is through future value estimation, by taking either maximum




Figure 4.3: Training progress of the learning agents

or the average of action values in the next state. To strike a balance between the two, we introduce an *idealization coefficient* in computing the estimate of future value:

$$\text{future} = \text{avg}_a + \eta(\max_a - \text{avg}_a)$$

where $0 \leq \eta \leq 1$ is the idealization coefficient, and *avg* and *max* refer to action value estimates in the next state.

The interpretable η hyper-parameter could give way to generate diversity even among multiple configurations of the same algorithm. Comparable-strength agents with different risk-taking levels can help test the security solutions from multiple angles. Continuing in this direction, we encouraged model parsimony (lower population size, fewer and more shallow network layers, etc), as to increase the possibility to gain insight into the agent's decisions and thus understand how to counter it.

An exhaustive search of possible algorithm configurations was not possible, due to the large number of hyper-parameters, as well as the duration needed to decide whether a certain configuration is promising. As the other extreme, random search, was not a viable alternative either, we opted for a Bayesian Optimization [23] strategy for tuning model configurations. Due to the large computational effort for evaluating a single hyper-parameter setting, high exploitation rate (for the optimization strategy) and only few initial random configurations were utilized. The full list of optimization process parameters is given

in Appendix B.

One impediment we encountered was the lack of openly available implementations for Genetic Algorithm methods. Also, development speed would have been greatly increased by had there been mature model experimentation frameworks.

RESULTS

This section describes the observed outcomes of running the fixed-strategy and learning-based agents using various configurations, and stacks against each-other the best version of each.

5.1 PARAMETER SETTINGS

This section discusses how various hyper-parameter settings affected the performance of learning algorithms. A full list of the best configurations found, for each agent is given in Appendix B.

As opposed to classical RL benchmark problems, where the discount factor γ is set very close to 1, in this setting, lower values performed better. This is indicative of the relatively small number of actions that can be done in an episode. It forces agents to focus on high-value actions, and not waste time on negligible ones.

The η parameter proved to be useful. The best-performing configurations of each agent feature different values of η , but none of them too close to either extreme. This shows that neither full risk nor full caution brings the best results, but a balance between them.

QL excelled with a relatively high learning rate and gradual decay. This benefit could be a direct cause of the fact that its values were not randomly initialized and it was able to continue from where the greedy agent left off. DQN did best with a small network size, both in terms of width and depth. Larger configurations would have had the potential of matching or even surpassing this performance in the long run, but if left for an equal amount of wall time, so could the smaller configuration improve as well. XCS thrived when the wild-card probability was set to lower than a third. This could be caused by the condensed feature representation, in which each position entails useful information.

For the issue of feature selection, the best-performing agents look at action availability, take into consideration almost all actions, and restrict machines seen to the current and its neighbors. This is likely caused by the fact that the less complex configuration is handled much better, even though it has a lower performance ceiling than the more complex configuration which is easy to get lost in, even though it makes it possible to achieve a higher performance.

The environment and agents were run under Python 3.6 in CentOS 7, on Intel Xeon E5v3 CPUs and Tesla Nvidia K80 GPUs. DQN's

neural networks use the Keras [21] implementation, most part of XCS uses an open-source implementation [21], the Bayesian Optimization process uses an open-source implementation as well [32].

We encountered two main challenges in applying RL methods in this research. First, the dissimilarity from classical RL environments and more specifically typical modern benchmarks means that the good performance reported there does not necessarily transfer to this case. One big difference is the large number of actions and the fact that not all of them are available at the same time.

Second, the long training times (upwards of 60 hours) of the agents, coupled with high sensitivity to and large number (for example, more than 20 in XCS' case) of hyper-parameters made it extremely hard to find good configurations. On top of this, GPU computation offered no speed-up. The environment's rules are computed on CPU. QL and XCS use mainly random-access indexing, which GPUs are inefficient at. The small network and few training epochs of DQN make the GPU overhead outweigh computation speed-ups.

5.2 AGENT COMPARISON

This section compares the performance of fixed-strategy and learning agents against a random baseline and a human target. Their overall performance, in terms of reward achieved, is analyzed as well individual strengths.




Figure 5.1: Distribution of each agent's performance

Figure 5.1 shows the total reward received by each agent. The evaluation is done at the end of training (for learning agents), on the best version of the algorithm (this includes fixed-strategy). Box-plots of 25 evaluations are used in order to showcase not only median results but also performance variance and best/worst cases.

The Random agent displays very high variance, sometimes doing relatively well, sometimes disastrously bad. FSM, while obtaining better overall performance, is still highly unreliable. Greedy, on the other hand, reduces the variance significantly while, at the same time, achieving a higher overall reward. This came as a surprise, as the Greedy algorithm is simpler than FSM, so we expected quite the contrary.

The *Human* agents represent the best performance achieved by the authors in the same environment. It does not represent the performance achieved by the most experienced pentester and is solely used as a relative benchmark for the learning agents. One thing it excels at is high predictability: even though it may not perform optimally, a very similar result is obtained regardless of environmental variations.

The best performing agent is QL, which manages to surpass human performance, both on average and for the best run. XCS yields just below human performance but features less variance than QL. This could turn out to be equally valuable: a steady behavior, rather than an erratic one, may come closer to what real experienced attackers display. DQN is the worst performer out of the learning agents, having the most variance, and sometimes even obtaining uncharacteristically low scores. Nevertheless, it performs considerably better than fixed-strategy agents. While DQN has more generalization power and could be able to learn more complex relationships, the large training times, the amount of and the sensitivity to hyper-parameters make it hard to steer.

Each of the fixed-strategy agents performs bad, relatively to learning agents. But if we compare learning strategies among each-other, the disparities become more evident. For example, DQN does much better than even the best fixed-strategy agent (Greedy), but compared to QL, or even XCS, it achieves only moderately good performance.

Upon inspection of the other metrics (described in 3.5), we get an overview of how the different agents act. QL is, understandably so, the fastest, while XCS has the highest number of moves and time steps, perhaps indicative of a less-riskier approach. DQN has a slightly higher propensity to exfiltrate data while QL also gives attention to credentials dumping. XCS wastes little time on secondary objectives on its way to the primary goal. All three algorithms obtain a similar and fairly high percentage of machines compromises (foothold), which could be caused by the small network size.




Figure 5.2: Agents objectives focus

Figure 5.2 shows the relative contribution of each rewarded action, be it positive (gaining foothold on a machine, obtaining user credentials or exfiltrating data), or negative (being detected or taking a long time). Sections sizes reflect an average over the 5 episodes in which each agent performed best.

QL manages to find the actions that yield the highest reward, in the least amount of time. It is also not adverse to taking risks: constructed strategy is fast but somewhat reckless, getting detected sometimes. It is also the most varied in terms of reward sources, spreading its effort not only in gaining foothold, but also obtaining credentials, much more so than the other agents. XCS gravitates towards a methodical, precise approach: not rushing and being careful not to get detected. It also invests most time in securing a wide, stable foothold and gives little attention to other positive reward sources. DQN developed the noisiest strategy. Even though it obtains large positive rewards, it is held back by the numerous times it gets detected, more than the other agents.

Part III

CLOSING

This part briefly summarizes the results and observations of this thesis by drawing overall conclusions. Afterwards, possible future directions and natural next steps are discussed.

CONCLUSIONS

This project formalizes penetration test as a Reinforcement Learning problem. The performance of multiple fixed-strategy (Random, Greedy, Finite State Machine) and learning-based (Q-Learning, Deep Q-Network, Extended Classifier System) agents is measured. Q-Learning, with some extra techniques applied and greedy agent initialization, performed best, surpassing human performance in the given environment. This work shows how manual penetration testing shortcomings can be overcome by finding attacker strategies through Machine Learning methods.

Implementing the aforementioned algorithms began a thorough understanding of RL concepts, mechanics used by various techniques and difficulties faced by the domain. Designing the rules and levers of a pentesting environment required comprehensive understanding of both pentesting phases and techniques as well as RL logistics. Analyzing the performance of various algorithms, together with their response to multiple hyper-parameter settings shed light into their strengths and peculiarities.

Although comparable in strength, different agents develop different strategies. This can be a great advantage: testing against a variety of attack styles could likely yield better measurements of defensive solutions rather than testing against a homogenous set of strategies, varying only in strength. XCS, which claims second place in overall performance develops a more methodical, steadier approach. Compared to QL, the best performer, which learns a high-risk/high-reward style. Regarding hyper-parameters, the introduced idealization factor η proved to be useful across all three learning-based algorithms. The strongest strategies are characterized by neither total aggression, nor extreme care, and this hyper-parameter allows an easier management of this dimension.

The main objective was reached – building an agent that can learn to penetrate a network comparable in strength to a human. Granted, the environment is a simulation, and like any other model, it has to abstract out some relationships. Also, the human standard for comparison is not provided by an absolute expert pentester. Nonetheless, this work paves the way for exciting new directions, some of which are detailed in the next chapter.

FUTURE WORK

While the essential problem of automating pentesting has been shown to be possible, there are still plenty of directions to explore. From different algorithms for the attacker and the defender, to multiple environment settings, more precise environment formalization and finally, bringing simulations to real situations.

Other algorithms for learning the attacker's strategy can be experimented with, aiming to mitigate current shortcomings. Methods making use of policy-gradient, such as A3C [30], could better deal with the large number of actions. The issue of dissimilarity from usual algorithm benchmarks could be mitigated by using an algorithm robust to hyper-parameter settings, such as Trust Region Optimization [37] or Exploration Strategies [34]. Much like DQN is a generalization of QL, so too can Generalized Decision Trees (GDT) [3] seen as a natural generalization of XCS.




Figure 7.1: A GDT amidst a cross-over operation

Figure 7.1 shows a GDT in which the left sub-tree (grey) is being swapped with another sub-tree (maroon) cut from a different tree. While XCS had only boolean rules on state features (represented here by pentagonal leaves), GDTs can evolve arbitrarily complex arithmetic, logical and comparison operations (represented here by circular nodes) until finally choosing an action (represented by square leaves).

The current work measures the outcome of simulating multiple attacker agents in a single environment, but it would be interesting to note their advantages on various network topologies, defender strength levels, and environment difficulty levels. To this end, a method for automatically generating valid enterprise networks would be use-

ful, which could integrate evaluation tools such as the one presented in [33].

More sophisticated defender algorithms can be tried. Game Theory concepts can be applied, specifically treating the problem as a Stackelberg Security Game [31]. Specifically, the allocation of action-blocking "attention resources" can benefit from this. These techniques have been successfully applied in physical security domains such as finding the optimal allocation of airport security officers, given incomplete knowledge of the attacker, and many more points to defend than staff available.

A more faithful representation of the security environment can be pursued. The current formulation models short-term attacks, where longer operation times are explicitly penalized. Starting points would be to change the waiting-duration dynamics and implement remaining ATT&CK actions, such as *collection* (key-logger, webcam, etc) or *command & control* (periodically communicate with an external entity). Measuring long-term impact would enable modeling attacks that focus on stealth and longstanding infiltration.

The final outcome of this project is a way to more easily test security solutions. Developing an efficient simulated attacker is the main problem. Naturally, after satisfactory performance has been achieved in the simulated environment, the next step would be to test its efficiency in the real world. This would involve mapping abstract actions to real commands and translate the system state into feature vectors. Having done this, the simulated defender can be replaced by actual security software, and the agents can be benchmarked against real security solutions.

Part IV

APPENDIX



SCENARIO CONFIGURATION

This section details the environment which the attacker algorithms have been evaluated in. Network topology and machines information is given in Table A.1. Costs of each attacker action are given in Table A.2, and in Table A.3 participating exploits. Table A.4 lists rewards given in response to attacker actions (*time* is multiplied by action's duration).

Table A.1: Network topology

Machine	Conns	User	OS	#Vulns	Admins
0 entry	1	dev	windows_xp	7	dev1
1	0 2	nontech	windows_8	6	a2, nt1
2	1 3 4	admin	debian_linux	3	a1, a2
3	2	nontech	windows_vista	7	a2, nt2
4	2 5	dev	windows_10	4	a2, d1
5	4 6 7	dev	ubuntu_linux	4	a1, a2, d2
6	5	admin	wserver_2012	3	a1, a2
7 goal	5	admin	wserver_2016	2	a1

Table A.2: Properties of attacker actions

Action	Reliability	Noise	Duration	Reduction
enumerate	0.95	0.075	4	
scan	1	0.025	4	
escalate	0.85	0.15	1	
persist	0.95	0.025	1	0.95
dump	0.9	0.1	1	
exfiltrate	0.9	0.1	3	
cleanup	0.9	0	3	0.95
migrate	0.8	0.1	1	
login	0.95	0.025	1	
evade	0.8	0	3	0.5
wait	1	0	4	
abandon	1	0	0	

Table A.3: Available attacker exploits and their properties

CVE	Reliability	Noise	Duration	Crash
2008-2992	0.875	0.2	4	0
2008-5353	0.99	0.2	1	0.1
2009-3459	0.875	0.2	4	0
2010-0840	0.99	0	1	0.1
2010-0842	0.95	0	1	0.1
2011-2371	0.75	0.2	1	0.1
2011-3556	0.99	0	1	0.1
2011-3659	0.65	0.2	1	0.15
2012-0897	0.75	0	4	0
2012-1533	0.99	0.2	1	0.1
2012-1775	0.75	0.2	4	0
2012-1823	0.99	0	1	0.1
2012-3993	0.99	0.2	2	0
2012-4681	0.99	0.2	1	0.1
2013-0753	0.75	0.2	4	0
2013-0757	0.99	0.2	4	0
2013-1493	0.75	0.2	1	0.1
2013-2465	0.95	0.2	1	0.1
2013-3205	0.75	0.2	4	0
2014-1511	0.99	0.2	2	0
2014-3704	0.99	0	1	0.1
2014-6352	0.99	0.2	4	0
2016-2098	0.99	0	1	0.1
2017-11882	0.25	0.2	4	0.2

Table A.4: Rewards given for attacker actions

Action	Reward
time	-0.01
goal	1
detection	-0.05
foothold	0.1
exfiltrate	0.05

AGENTS HYPER-PARAMETERS

This section lists the parameters we found work best, for all agents. FSM order and Greedy preference is presented next, followed by feature selection results. Table B.1 lists the parameters of the hyperparameter optimization process and Tables B.2, B.3, B.4 show the parameters of QL, XCS and DQN, respectively. The strategy chosen by the human agent is given in Table B.5.

Finite State Machine agent order:

1. login
2. enumerate
3. escalate
4. migrate
5. exfiltrate
6. dump

Greedy agent preference:

1. exfiltrate
2. escalate
3. login
4. enumerate
5. migrate
6. dump

Feature selection:

- shown performed actions: none
- shown actions availability: all
- reduce exploits: yes
- only neighbors: yes
- disallowed actions: *abandon*

Table B.1: Bayesian Optimization process parameters

Parameter	Chosen value
Acquisition function	UCB
κ	2
GP kernel	Matern (generalized RBF)
Matern ν	2.5
Matern α	1e-10
GP optimizer	L-BFGS-B
Initial Observations	16

Table B.2: Q-Learning hyper-parameters

Parameter	Found value	Sensible range
Boltzmann τ	2	[0.5, 10]
Discount γ	0.87	[0.5, 0.999]
Exploration ϵ initial	1	[0.2, 1]
Exploration ϵ decay	0.999994	[0.9999, 0.999999]
Exploration ϵ min	0.1	[0.3, 0.0001]
Idealization η	0.6	[0, 1]
Learning rate α initial	0.158	[1e-7, 1]
Learning rate α decay	0.999995	[0.9999, 0.999999]
Learning rate α min	0.0001	[1e-10, 1e-7]
Episodes	150,000	

Table B.3: XCS hyper-parameters

Parameter	Found value	Sensible ranges
accuracy_coefficient	0.1	(0, 1]
accuracy_power	5	(0, 100)
crossover_probability	0.85	(0, 0.95)
deletion_threshold	50	[0, 500]
discount_factor	0.9	[0.5, 0.999]
do_action_set_subsumption	yes	{yes, no}
do_ga_subsumption	yes	{yes, no}
eps_decay	0.999985	[0.9999, 0.999999]
eps_min	0.01	[0.3, 0.0001]
error_threshold	0.01	[0, 1]
exploration_probability	0.65	[0.2, 1]
fitness_threshold	0.1	[0, 1]
ga_threshold	20	[0, 100]
idealization_factor	0.9	[0, 1]
initial_error	1e-5	(0, 0.1]
initial_fitness	1e-5	(0, 10]
initial_prediction	1e-5	(0, 1]
learning_rate	0.1	[1e-7, 1]
lr_decay	0.999986	[0.9999, 0.999999]
lr_min	0.01	[1e-10, 1e-7]
max_population_size	200	[10, 5000]
minimum_actions	1	[1, 100]
mutation_probability	0.1	[0.01, 0.9]
subsumption_threshold	25	[0, 100]
wildcard_probability	0.2	[0.05, 0.9]
episodes	50,000	

Table B.4: DQN hyper-parameters

Parameter	Found value	Sensible options
batch_normalization	yes	{yes, no}
batch_size	32	[1, 8192]
discount	0.9	[0.5, 0.999]
double	yes	{yes, no}
dueling	yes	{yes, no}
exploration_anneal_steps	20,000	[5,000; 25,000]
exploration_min	0.05	[0.3, 0.0001]
exploration_q_clip	(-1,000; + 1,000)	[0.1, 10000] ²
exploration_start	1	[0.2, 1]
exploration_temp	2	[0.5, 10]
exploration_temp_min	0.2	[0.001, 1]
hidden_activation	relu	{sigmoid, tanh, selu }
hidden_dropout	0.4	[0, 0.9]
history_len	1	[1, 5]
idealization	0.7	[0, 1]
input_dropout	0.2	[0, 0.6]
layer_sizes	(128, 64)	[8, 1024] ^[1,5]
loss	logcosh	{mse, mae, logcosh}
lr_decay	0.99993	[0.9999, 0.999999]
lr_init	0.1	[1e-7, 1]
lr_min	0.0005	[1e-10, 1e-7]
memory_size	50,000	[5,000; 1,000,000]
multi_steps	2	[1, 8]
n_epochs	1	[1, 10]
out_activation	softmax	{linear, softmax}
policy	max-boltzmann	{eps-greedy, boltzmann}
prioritize_replay	yes	{yes, no}
priority_exp	0.01	(0, 1)
priority_shift	0.1	(0, 5)
q_clip	(-10,000; +10,000)	[0.1, 100000] ²
streams_size	32	[4, 512]
target_update_freq	1,000	[100; 5,000]
weights_init	lecun_uniform	{uniform, normal}
episodes	25,000	

Table B.5: Steps taken by the "Human" agent

Action	Machine
evade	-
exploit	0
enumerate	0
scan	1
escalate	0
dump	0
migrate	1
enumerate	1
scan	2
exploit	2
enumerate	2
login	4
enumerate	4
scan	5
exploit	5
persist	5
escalate	5
dump	5
enumerate	5
login	7
escalate	7
exfiltrate	7

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COLOPHON

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